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Note
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Commission of Webster County:
Equal Protection in Property Taxation,
A New Challenge To Proposition 13?
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n the United
States Supreme Court held that it was an unconstitutional viola-
tion of equal protection for the assessor of Webster County to sub-
ject similarly situated properties to different tax burdens depend-
ing on when they were purchased. The Court stated it "need not"
and did not decide whether the California system of property tax-
ation under Article XIII A of the California Constitution, enacted
as Proposition 13, would "stand on a different footing." The
Court's collateral reference has inspired recent challenges to Pro-
position 13. This Note addresses the United States Supreme
Court's equal protection analysis and its possible application to
California's Article XIII A.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eleven years after the voters of California passed Proposition 13,1
the Tax Limitation Initiative, the United States Supreme Court may
have rekindled the debate over its constitutionality in Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County.'
1. Proposition 13, the Tax Limitation Initiative, was adopted June 6, 1978. CAL.
CONsT. art. XIII A (1988).
2. 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
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The Court held that the Webster County, West Virginia tax assessor
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by
valuing the petitioners' land on the basis of its recent purchase price
while making only minor modifications in the assessed value of com-
parable property which had not been recently sold.' The Court found
that the disparity in the allocation of the tax burdens arising from
the "relative undervaluation of comparable property" was a denial of
equal protection.4
In Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court specifically referred to the
California scheme of property taxation under article XIII A of the
California Constitution, which was created by Proposition 13. The
Court recognized that the provisions of Proposition 13 might result
in the same kind of disparities condemned in Allegheny Pittsburgh;
that is, similarly situated properties that bear different tax burdens
depending on when they were purchased. 5 The Court laid the
groundwork to distinguish the California system, stating that the
seemingly "aberrational enforcement policy" at issue in the West
Virginia case might "stand on a different footing if it were the law of
a State, generally applied," as in California.6 But the Court made no
reference to Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization7 in which the California Supreme
Court had addressed the equal protection issue in an early, and un-
successful, challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 13.
By suggesting that the constitutionality of the California system of
property taxation might be questioned in the context of the Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh case, the United States Supreme Court seems to
have left the door open to an equal protection challenge to the Pro-
position 13 tax system. This Note addresses the United States Su-
preme Court's equal protection analysis and its possible application
to California's article XIII A.
3. Id. at 639.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 637, 639.
6. The entire footnote, the last of only four footnotes in the unanimous opinion,
states:
We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County assessment
method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, gener-
ally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be.
The State of California has adopted a similar policy as Article XIII A of its
Constitution, popularly known as "Proposition 13." Proposition 13 generally
provides that property will be assessed at its 1975-1976 value, and reassessed
only when transferred, constructed upon, or in a limited manner for inflation.
The system is grounded on the belief that taxes should be based on the original
cost of property and should not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of the
property.
Id. at 638 n.4 (citation omitted).
7. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
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II. BACKGROUND
The principles of equal protection as they apply to real property
taxation have been well established in a long line of cases. As early
as 1917, the United States Supreme Court stated "it must be re-
garded as settled that intentional systematic undervaluation by state
officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the
Constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his prop-
erty."" In disputes over discrimination, the burden of proof is on the
complaining party to prove the discrimination was intentional and
systematic. 9
Where the distinction in tax burdens is based on a state policy or
state law, a "different footing" has always been recognized. "The
States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes."' 0 The
United States Supreme Court stated in a 1929 case:
The applicable principles are familiar. The States have a wide discretion in
the imposition of taxes. When dealing with their proper domestic concerns,
and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the national government or vio-
lating the guarantees of the Federal Constitution, the States have the attri-
bute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to insure revenue
and foster their local interests. "
This principle has been repeated in numerous cases, many of
which are cited with approval in Allegheny Pittsburgh. For example,
in Nashville Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Browning, the
Court held that a state could distinguish railroad and utility property
from other property and require the former to bear a higher tax bur-
den than the latter.12 The Court stated: "That the states may clas-
sify property for taxation; may set up different modes of assessment,
valuation and collection; may tax some kinds of property at higher
rates than others . . . are among the commonplaces of taxation and
of constitutional law."' 3
The distinctions and classifications made by a state for taxation
purposes must not violate the equal protection clause of the four-
8. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1918).
9. For a listing of relevant equal protection cases, see Charleston Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assoc. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1945) (cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh,
109 S. Ct. at 637-38).
10. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1958) (cited in Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 638).
11. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930). The Court held there was
no violation of equal protection where the state taxed different classes of oil on a separate
basis.
12. 310 U.S. 362 (1940) (cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 639).
13. Id. at 368.
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teenth amendment. "Of course, the States, in the exercise of their
taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. .... But that clause im-
poses no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety
that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation."' 4
The Court enunciated the standard of review as early as 1920: "If
the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and
rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy,
there is no denial of the equal protection of the law."' 5 This standard
or test merely states the question that must be addressed in each
case: Does the state's system of taxation distinguish between proper-
ties on the basis of reasonable considerations of difference or policy,
or does it capriciously or arbitrarily discriminate between compara-
ble properties?
III. CALIFORNIA: PROPOSITION 13
A. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State
Board of Equalization
In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State
Board of Equalization,"6 the California Supreme Court reviewed a
seemingly comprehensive attack on Proposition 13, which had been
incorporated into the California Constitution as article XIII A. Peti-
tioners in Amador Valley raised two equal protection arguments in
challenging Proposition 13. One equal protection argument raised in
Amador Valley focused on the two-thirds voting requirement for
"special taxes;" it is not relevant to this analysis. But the primary
14. Allied Stores of Ohio, 358 U.S. at 526; accord Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1973) ("the States have large leeway in making
classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of
taxation").
15. Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910) (emphasis added)
(cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 638).
16. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
17. The petitioners in Amador Valley argued that the two-thirds voting require-
ment for enacting "special taxes" by local agencies (article XIII A, section 4) unduly
discriminated in favor of those casting negative votes. The court disposed of this conten-
tion in summary fashion. It held that "[b]ecause persons who vote in favor of tax mea-
sures may not be deemed to represent a definite, identifiable class, equal protection prin-
ciples do not forbid 'debasing' their vote by requiring a two-thirds approval of such
measures." Id. at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294-95, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
Interestingly, the state court's treatment of this issue had been prescribed by decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court had originally held
a two-thirds requirement for approval of bonds violated federal equal protection princi-
ples. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970).
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated that decision, Mihaly v. Westbrook,
403 U.S. 915 (1971), and remanded it for reconsideration in light of its holding in
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In Gordon, the United States Supreme Court up-
held a 60% voting requirement primarily because it did not single out any "discrete and
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equal protection argument in Amador Valley was the "rollback" of
assessed valuation to "full cash value" would result in "invidious dis-
crimination between owners of similarly situated property."' 8 This
argument is at the crux of the issue later raised in Allegheny
Pittsburgh.
Proposition 13 overturned the system of assessing real property at
its current value, which tied assessment value to the property's cur-
rent fair market value. In its place, Proposition 13 required assess-
ment of property taxes to be based on the "full cash value" of the
property. The new assessment system included two important restric-
tions. First, the assessment restrictions of Proposition 13 limited the
"full cash value" to the "appraised value of real property when pur-
chased, newly constructed or a change in ownership has oc-
curred . . . .19 Second, for owners who purchased their property
before 1975, Proposition 13's rollback provision limited "full cash
value" to "the county assessor's valuation ... as shown on the
1975-76 tax bill." 20
When these provisions went into effect in 1978 they actually cre-
ated two groups of property owners who gained comparative tax ad-
vantages that still exist today. The first group consists of pre-1975
owners whose property assessment was rolled back to the assessed
value as of 1975. The second group consists of people who bought
their property after 1975 but whose property appreciated due to in-
flation or minor improvements which did not trigger reassessment.
As the California Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee rec-
ognized in 1980: "The effect of the Section 2 assessment restrictions
is to stabilize taxes for persons who remain in their homes, and allow
increases to market value only for those acquiring or improving real
property."'"
In Amador Valley, the California Supreme Court addressed both
of these property tax classifications and found no violation of federal
insular" minority for special treatment. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 7.
18. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 232, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
19. Id. at 232, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249. The original proposition
listed certain exceptions to this clause and later amendments have added to the list. The
term "newly constructed" exempts construction following certain disasters, addition to
solar energy systems or construction in order to comply with certain government-imposed
safety standards. Additionally, there are numerous exceptions to the "change in owner-
ship" provision primarily related to involuntary changes in ownership or intra-family
transfers.
20. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2, sub. a (1988).
21. ASSEMBLY REVENUE AND TAX'N COMM., PROPOSITION 13 ASSESSMENT ISSUES,
A BRIEFING BOOK FOR OVERSIGHT HEARINGS A-7 (Sept. 1980).
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equal protection principles. Under the "full cash value" or "acquisi-
tion value"22 system, each year those who have recently purchased
real property may be required to pay higher taxes than owners of
similarly situated property who purchased their property in previous
years. 23 The California Supreme Court held that the more recent
purchasers were not unduly discriminated against even though they
would pay higher taxes than owners of similarly situated property. In
fact, the court found that the acquisition value system could "oper-
ate on a fairer basis than a current value approach" because each
property owner would be assessed and taxed on the same basis. That
is, each piece of property would be assessed and taxed on the basis of
the cost of the property, "assuming [the cost] represented the then
fair market value." 24
The court also considered a group of property owners who were
potentially disadvantaged by the rollback provisions: those whose
true acquisition value was lower than the "full cash value" shown on
the 1975-76 tax rolls. The court held that "[t]hese persons cannot
complain of any unfair treatment in view of the substantial tax ad-
vantage gained by the rollback. ' 25 Although the 1975 cutoff date
might seem arbitrary, the court determined that the policies of ad-
ministrative convenience and of ensuring adequate tax revenues were
an adequate basis for it.26
The petitioners in Amador Valley relied on a number of cases in
which "intentional, systematic undervaluation of property similarly
situated with other property assessed at its full value" was held to
22. "Full cash value" is the term used in the text of Proposition 13 but the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court used the term "acquisition value." Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at
232, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251. The term "acquisition value" may more
accurately reflect Proposition 13's system of property valuation because the term "full
cash value" might be confused with the concept of "fair market value." Therefore, the
term acquisition value is used in the following discussion.
23. This is true assuming property values are increasing for all the similarly situ-
ated property and that the rate of increase is higher than the two percent inflationary
allowance under the California Constitution. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII A, § 2, sub. b
(1988).
24. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 235, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
The court ignored the cumulative effect. A simple example of the cumulative effect can
be seen in the following hypothetical. Assume the properties at 100 Suburban Lane and
102 Suburban Lane are identical tract homes. When the homes were first purchased in
1975 they were both worth $30,000; in April 1989, they are both for sale at $170,000. A,
the owner of 100 Suburban Road, purchased the home in 1975 and has not moved; she
has paid $300 in property tax each year for fourteen tax years since the passage of
Proposition 13 (a total of $4,200). The property next door at 102 Suburban Lane has
had seven owners (who purchased the home every other year for $20,000 above the price
paid by the previous buyer). The seven owners of 102 Suburban Lane have paid a total
of $12,600, three times more tax than that paid by A for her similarly situated property
at 100 Suburban Lane. But when A sells her home, she will recover the full current value
of the property without ever compensating for the lower taxes she has paid.
25. Id. at 236, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
26. Id.
1178
[VOL 26: 1173, 1989] Challenge to Prop. 13
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
constitute an improper discrimination in violation of equal protection
principles.27 The court distinguished these cases because the success-
ful challenges were brought against a background in which the state
legislature had mandated a system of current valuation. The court
noted that the passage of Proposition 13 by the voters of California
changed the state's basis of valuation to that of "full cash value."2
The court found there was nothing in either the California or federal
constitution mandating the current value approach to real property
valuation. For support, the court pointed out that the California
Constitution "contemplates" the use of a value standard other than
fair market value.2 9 Additionally, it noted that the United States Su-
preme Court had previously held the states are "not limited to ad
valorem taxation." 30 Finally, the California Supreme Court com-
pared the acquisition value basis for real property taxation to the
computation of sales tax; the court did not, however, address the
question of whether different policies underlie property and sales
taxes.31 The court equated the two tax systems "whereby the taxes
one pays are closely related to the acquisition value of the
property. 3 2
The California Supreme Court, in analyzing the equal protection
challenge in Amador Valley, reached two essential conclusions, the
27. Id. at 234, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251; see, e.g., Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946) (unequal assessment not in accordance with state
statute); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Greene County, 284 U.S. 23, 28 (1931) (discrimina-
tion in state taxation of coal tracts); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S.
441, 445 (1923) (taxpayer who was discriminated against had a right to have his assess-
ment reduced even though it was a departure from the requirement of the ad valorem
taxation laws).
28. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2 (1988).
29. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 236, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
30. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 261 U.S. 146, 159 (1930) (cited in Amador Valley,
22 Cal. 3d at 236, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252).
31. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 235-36, 583 P.2d at 1293-94, 149 Cal. Rptr. at
251-52. Even after Proposition 13, the assessed value of property is not necessarily equal
to the purchase price. Sales taxes, on the other hand, are always applied to the actual
price paid. In a California Senate Committee hearing which focused on the inequities
caused by the Proposition 13 system of property taxation, the counsel for the State Board
of Equalization stated:
The assessor now and always has used the fair market value standards which
can be somewhat different from the purchase price. You can pay more for the
property if you get favorable returns. You might find a distressed seller who a
buyer could take advantage of and consequently he may get it at less than
market value.
Interim Hearing on Proposition 13, Senate Comm. on Revenue and Tax'n, 1979-80 Sess.
11 (1980) (remarks of Mr. Larry Augusta, Tax Counsel, Board of Equalization).
32. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 236, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
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second of which was wholly unsubstantiated. First, the court con-
cluded that a rational relation to a valid state policy is a sufficient
basis for discrimination to overcome an equal protection challenge.
For this conclusion, the court relied on a long and consistent line of
United States Supreme Court cases holding that each state has "a
large leeway" in drawing up a system of taxation.33 The principle
that "'[a] state tax law is not arbitrary although it "discriminate[s]
in favor of a certain class . . . if the discrimination is founded upon
a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy" not in conflict
with the Federal Constitution . . . .' has weathered nearly a cen-
tury of Supreme Court adjudication." 34
But the California Supreme Court did not have the same kind of
support for its second conclusion that Proposition 13 bore a rational
relation to a valid state policy. The court sidestepped the task of
actually defining the applicable state policy to which Proposition 13
was directed. The court merely found the "acquisition value" ap-
proach might provide a fairer basis for assessment than a current
value approach, but it did not substantiate its opinion. The disparate
result in property taxes was found to be fair and equitable in that
each owner's taxes would reflect the price that he or she was origi-
nally willing to pay "rather than an inflated value fixed, after acqui-
sition, in part on the basis of sales to third parties over which sales
[the owner] can exercise no control. ' 35 The California Supreme
Court concluded its equal protection discussion by stating: "We can-
not say that the acquisition value approach incorporated in article
XIII A, by which a property owner's tax liability bears a reasonable
relation to his costs of acquisition, is wholly arbitrary or irrational.
Accordingly, the measure under scrutiny herein meets the demands
of equal protection principles." 36
B. Amador Valley: Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rose Bird filed a separate opinion, concurring in
part but dissenting from the court's equal protection analysis. Justice
Bird raised the issue of whether it was enough for the court to sim-
ply assume a rational state policy justified the disparities created by
Proposition 13. The Chief Justice concluded: "Under article XIIIA
property taxpayers are not treated equally, and those sections which
33. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1972)
("the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their
judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation"). For a discussion of these principles
of taxation and constitutional law, see supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
34. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 234, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250
(citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 155-56 (1974)).
35. Id. at 235, P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
36. Id. at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
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promote this disparity must fall.""7
In her dissent, Justice Bird pointed out that although any initia-
tive passed by the people of the state must be given great deference,
"even minimal scrutiny requires that [such initiatives must] be de-
fensible in terms of a shared public good."3 8 She noted the absence
of a documented state policy decision in favor of assessment based
on full cash value. She argued that in this case, "[n]o one has yet
established what benefits the general public derives from the system-
atic undervaluation of the property of pre-1975 purchasers, and this
court should decline to hypothesize rationales."'39
The Chief Justice foresaw that the inequality caused by article
XIII A of the California Constitution would be the systematic impo-
sition of different assessments on properties of similar worth. Focus-
ing on the cumulative effects of the disparate tax treatment, Chief
Justice Bird hypothesized:
Initially, properties purchased in earlier years will be undervalued in com-
parison with other properties (though they may be identical in current fair
market value) purchased, constructed, or transferred in later years. Then as
the years go by, the skewed nature of the tax world created by Article
XIIIA will become even more pronounced as each successive generation of
purchasers will have their property overvalued in comparison to their neigh-
bors or predecessor owners.'
The Chief Justice argued that the analysis of the equal protection
issue required more of "a serious and genuine judicial inquiry" than
that given by the majority in this case. Justice Bird noted that judi-
cial analysis was constrained by two extremes. At one extreme, the
courts are compelled by the fourteenth amendment to overturn laws
which deny equal protection, although the courts are reluctant to
overturn laws solely on the grounds of denial of equal protection. At
the other extreme, the fourteenth amendment requires the court to
defer to the will of the people, expressed in the passage of Proposi-
tion 13 and its subsequent enactment as- article XIII A of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. Justice Bird argued that despite these recog-
nized constraints, the court had a duty to assess the equal protection
37. Id. at 249, 583 P.2d at 1303, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 260. The criticism seems well
aimed. The majority opinion refers to no articulated social or economic policy supporting
the passage of Proposition 13. Instead, the Court found the effects of the changes in the
tax law whereby "an acquisition value basis [sic] predicated on the owner's free and
voluntary acts of purchase . . . is an arguably reasonable basis for assessment." Id. at
235, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
38. Id. at 250, 583 P.2d at 1303-04, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
39. Id. at 251, 583 P.2d at 1304, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
40. Id. at 252, 583 P.2d at 1305, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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challenge, and had failed to do so.
I am aware that during the past 40 years, since the end of the Lochner era,
courts have not used the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws . . . because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought. I fully agree that in regard to matters
of economics and tax policy, courts must defer to the will of the people
unless the challenged enactment lacks a rational basis. However, the ra-
tional basis test was never meant to authorize judicial tolerance of unconsti-
tutional classifications.
1
Chief Justice Bird concluded: "If a serious and genuine judicial in-
quiry is made of the classifications under section 2(a) [of article
XIII A], it is clear that they violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution by treating identical or similarly situated property
taxpayers in an unfair and unequal way."42
IV. ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL CO. V. COUNTY
COMMISSION43
A. Facts of the Case
The Webster County, West Virginia assessment procedure was
based on the acquisition value of the real property, a practice which
would be consistent with California's real property taxation system
after Proposition 13. This practice resulted in gross disparities be-
tween the taxes paid by the petitioners and taxes paid by owners of
similarly situated property who had luckily purchased their land in
earlier years."
Between the years 1975 and 1986, the county tax assessor for
Webster County fixed the assessed value of property at the declared
consideration at which the property was last sold. The tax assess-
ments were then based upon roughly fifty percent of the assessed
value. Only minor adjustments were made in the assessments of
properties that had not recently sold.45 The actual result was that the
assessments of recently purchased properties were made at roughly
current value; the assessments of properties which had not recently
41. Id. at 255-56, 583 P.2d at 1307, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 256, 583 P.2d at 1307-08, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
43. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
This case represented a consideration of cases that were appealed to the West Virginia
Supreme Court as In Re 1975 Tax Assessments against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E. 2d
560, rev'd, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'r, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
44. For example, the Court found that for the years 1976 through 1982, Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. was assessed and taxed at approximately thirty-five times the
rate applied to owners of comparable properties. Similarly, after purchasing its land,
Kentucky Energy Corp. was assessed and taxed at approximately thirty-three times the
rate of similar parcels. From 1981 through 1985, the county assessed and taxed the
Shamrock-Oneida property at roughly eight to twenty times that of comparable neigh-
boring coal tracts. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 637.
45. They amounted to a maximum of 10% increases in 1976, 1981, and 1983. Id.
at 635.
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been purchased were based on much older, and lower, acquisition
prices.
The Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company (Allegheny) appealed
the tax assessment of its coal tract, which it had purchased in 1974.
In 1982 Allegheny sold the land to the East Kentucky Energy Cor-
poration (Kentucky Energy), which also appealed the decisions of
the county tax assessor.46 These cases were consolidated with other
cases involving Oneida Coal Company and Shamrock Coal Com-
pany, which had participated in similar transactions in Webster
County.4 7
On appeal from the West Virginia Circuit Court, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia had found that "assessments
based upon the price paid for the property in arm's length transac-
tions are an appropriate measure of the 'true and actual value'
of. . .property.' ' 48 The court also held that if the petitioners felt that
other properties were relatively undervalued, their only remedy was
to "seek to have the assessments of other taxpayers raised to market
value."4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on two
grounds: (1) to decide whether the tax assessments denied petitioners
equal protection of the law; and (2) if there was a violation of equal
protection, to decide "whether petitioners could constitutionally be
limited to the remedy of seeking to raise the assessments of
others." 50
B. The Court's Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion. The
Court held that "the relative undervaluation of comparable property
in Webster County over time" denied petitioner equal protection of
the law. Further, a "taxpayer in this situation cannot be remitted by
the State to the remedy of seeking to have assessments of the under-
46. In 1974, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. purchased its property for a stated
value somewhat in excess of $24 million and was assessed at roughly half this figure. In
1982, Kentucky Energy purchased the land for nearly $30 million, and the property was
thereafter assessed at just below $15 million. Id.
47. In re 1975 Tax Assessments against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560, 564
(1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
48. Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d at 564.
49. Id. at 565 (quoting Killen v. Logan Co. Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689, 709
(1982)).
50. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 637.
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valued property raised."''5
The Court began its discussion by focusing on the comparative
nature of an equal protection challenge. The Court agreed with the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia that petitioners could
not complain of an equal protection violation merely because the as-
sessment of their land was based on its purchase price. However, the
Court stated that the "complaint is a comparative one."5 2 The Court
assumed that the price paid by petitioners in a recent arm's length
transaction was a reasonable basis for determining the current value
of that land as well as the current value of neighboring comparable
properties which had not been recently sold. Given this rough esti-
mate or basis for current value, the Court's comparison of tax assess-
ments showed that the petitioners' property was assessed at fifty per-
cent of its estimated current value. However, the neighboring
comparable property was assessed at only a minor fraction of its cur-
rent value because the assessment value was based on grossly out-
dated purchase price information.53 The equal protection violation
arose because of the gross disparities in taxation between the prop-
erty which had been recently purchased and that which had not been
recently purchased.
The Court next addressed the state's argument that the assess-
ment scheme could be saved because of the periodic adjustments
based on "the general change in area property values" in lieu of in-
dividual reassessments.5 4 The Court disagreed. It stated that the con-
stitutional adequacy of the general adjustment must be tested both
in terms of the time element and the disparities within the same
class of taxpayers.
On the question of time, the Court stated that to satisfy the equal
protection clause, general adjustments must be "accurate enough
over a short period of time to equalize the difference in proportion
between the assessments of a class of property holders. 55 The Court
found that the problems in Webster County were not merely due to
transitional delay. In addition, the taxation disparities could not be
adequately resolved by the adjustments periodically made to the as-
sessments of land which had not been recently purchased. Petition-
51. Id. at 639.
52. Id. at 637.
53. The Court explained the assessment method as follows:
Between 1975 and 1986, the tax assessor for Webster County, West Virginia,
fixed yearly assessments for property within the County at 50% of appraised
value. She fixed the appraised value at the declared consideration at which the
property was last sold. Some adjustments were made in the assessments of
properties that had not recently been sold, although they amounted to, at most,
10% increases in 1976, 1981, and 1983 respectively.
Id. at 635.
54. Id. at 637-38.
55. Id. at 638.
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ers' property had been assessed and taxed at roughly eight to thirty-
five times the rate applied to comparable neighboring property over
a ten-year period. The Court found that the periodic, general adjust-
ments to the assessed value of the similarly situated property were
too small to "seasonably dissipate the remaining disparity"."6 The
Court noted that in the case of the Allegheny-Kentucky Energy
property, "the County's adjustment policy would have required more
than 500 years to equalize the assessments" with those of similarly
situated properties.57
On the issue of disparities within the same class of taxpayers, the
Court stated that no matter what the adjustment scheme, "the con-
stitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners." 58
This analysis focused on what could be the pivotal issue in testing
the constitutionality of California's Proposition 13: the state's power
to define classes of property owners to which it can assign different
tax burdens.
The Court started this discussion from a position of deference to
the states. "The States, of course, have broad powers to impose and
collect taxes."' 59 Furthermore, a state "may divide and assign to each
class a different tax burden as long as those divisions and burdens
are reasonable." 60 For support, the Court cited cases holding that it
was no violation of the equal protection clause to distinguish, for spe-
cific tax purposes, between corporations and individuals61 and be-
tween residents and nonresidents.62 The Court reiterated that there
is no violation of equal protection of the law "[i]f 'the selection or
56. Id.
57. Id. All of the property analyzed in the case was assessed at its original
purchase price, although across the board adjustments were made to the assessments of
property which had not recently been purchased. Then, the same tax rate was applied to
50% of the assessed value. Apparently, the gross disparities in property tax treatment
arose because the assessed values were based on the original purchase price of property;
for property which had not been recently purchased, the assessed value fell far behind
the market price. The increase in the assessed values of property which had not been
recently purchased, even with the periodic adjustments, did not keep pace with the as-
sessed values of the comparable property owned by the petitioners, for which the assessed




61. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (Illinois ad
valorem tax on personalty of corporations).
62. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (exemption from taxa-
tion of merchandise belonging to nonresident stored held in storage warehouse within
state).
1185
classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy . ...' "63
Nevertheless, the Court found that the practice in Webster
County was not based upon the kinds of distinctions which had
passed constitutional muster in the earlier cases cited by the Court.
Well-accepted principles support the states in applying different tax
burdens to corporations than to individuals6 4 or to distinguish be-
tween certain types of businesses.6 But no such distinctions could be
made between the petitioners' property and comparable coal tracts.
The Court found that the constitution and laws of West Virginia
provided that all property of the kind held by petitioners "shall be
taxed at a rate uniform throughout the state according to its esti-
mated market value."66
Had West Virginia adopted a different policy, the system might be
valid "so long as the implicit policy is applied even-handedly to all
similarly situated property within the state. ' 67 Here, however, the
Court found that the Webster County assessor had, "apparently on
her own initiative," applied the tax laws of West Virginia in a man-
ner contrary to the West Virginia Constitution and the guidelines
published by the West Virginia Tax Commission.68
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court's Reference to California's Proposition
13
In footnote four of the Allegheny Pittsburgh opinion, the United
States Supreme Court refers to the property taxation system in Cali-
fornia. The Court states that "[w]e need not and do not decide today
whether the Webster County assessment method would stand on a
different footing if it were the law of a State, generally ap-
plied , "...'" The Court noted that California had adopted a simi-
lar policy through the initiative process which enacted article XIII A
63. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 638 (citing Brown-Forman Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910) (license tax on residents)).
64. See supra notes 10-14, 60-63 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362,
368 (1940) (states may classify property for taxation and tax some at higher rates than
others "and in making all these differentiations may treat railroads and other utilities
with that separateness which their distinctive characteristics and functions in society
make appropriate") (emphasis added); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920) (discretion to tax resident and nonresident corporations); Brown-Forman Co.
v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910) (license tax not discriminatory). See supra notes
10-14, 60-63 and accompanying text.
66. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 638.
67. Id. at 638-39.
68. Id. at 639.
69. Id. at 638 n.4.
1186
[VOL. 26: 1173, 1989] Challenge to Prop. 13
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
of the California Constitution. The Court simply noted the Califor-
nia system was "grounded on the belief that taxes should be based
on the original cost of property and should not tax unrealized gains
in the value of the property. ' 70 The Court did not give any refer-
ences to support this presumed policy.
Why did the Court devote a footnote in the Allegheny Pittsburgh
opinion to the California system of property assessment and taxa-
tion? The simplest explanation is the Supreme Court simply wanted
to avoid re-opening the door to litigation on the equal protection as-
pects of California's tax system. If this was the Court's purpose, the
footnote reference was meant to limit the Court's decision to the
facts of Allegheny Pittsburgh and the methodology used by Webster
County in assessing property values in the absence of a rational state
policy supporting differential tax treatment. This interpretation
seems to be supported by the court's emphasis that there was no
state policy at issue in this case. Instead, the constitution and laws of
West Virginia "provide that all property of the kind held by petition-
ers shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the state according
to its estimated market value."71
Nevertheless, the Court could have limited its opinion to the facts
of the case without ever implicating the California system. The dis-
tinctions between the apparently "aberrational enforcement policy" 72
of the Webster County tax assessor and California's popularly
elected statewide taxation system are obvious without the Court's
disclaimer. The Court, in fact, seemed to protest too much. The im-
mediate response to the Allegheny Pittsburgh case was that the
Court "appeared to invite challenges to a provision of California's
Proposition 13 allowing for disparate taxation of properties of equal
value." 73
The reason for the Court's reference to California's system of
property taxation cannot be found on the face of the Allegheny
Pittsburgh opinion, nor in the briefs of the petitioner or the respon-
dent. But the amici curiae briefs submitted to the Court provide an
explanation: four amici curiae briefs were submitted and each one
specifically addressed the constitutionality of the California assess-
70. Id.
71. Id. at 638.
72. Id. at 638 n.4.
73. Different Value for Property of Equal Worth-Proposition 13's "Irrational
Tax World", L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1989, at B6, col. I(S.D. ed.); see also Tax Revolt
1990: Hello Guidlock, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at Al, col. I(S.D. ed.).
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ment system.74
The two amici curiae briefs submitted in support of the petitioners
in the case argued that the California system resulted in inequities in
the assessment of property tax. The International Association of As-
sessing Officers (IAAO) equated California's property taxation sys-
tem with a legalized "welcome stranger" assessment, which refers to
the practice of reassessing properties that happened to have been
sold while not reassessing similar or surrounding properties.75 Fur-
thermore, the IAAO argued that the California Supreme Court
erred in its ruling in Amador Valley: "[T]he court (wrongly, we
think) hypothesized a 'rational basis' (namely, that certainty about
one's future property tax burdens overrode traditional notions of eq-
uity, ability to pay or benefits received). 7 6
The National Taxpayers Union (NTU) also criticized the Califor-
nia system of property taxation in its amicus curiae brief which it
submitted in support of the petitioners in the Allegheny Pittsburgh
case. The NTU emphasized that article XIII A of the California
Constitution provides two kinds of property tax provisions. The NTU
noted that it reaffirmed "the importance of the tax limitations con-
tained in Proposition 13, and particularly the two percent ceiling on
increases in assessments." 77 It argued, however, that the California
system of assessing property is discriminatory. 78 The NTU disagreed
with the California Supreme Court's holding in Amador Valley.
74. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Internat'l Assoc. of Assessing Officers in Support
of Petitioners, Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303 and 87-1310);
Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Taxpayers Union in Support of Petitioners, Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-1310); Brief of Amici Cu-
riae, Pacific Legal Foundation, Paul Gann, and California Tax Reduction Movement in
Support of Respondent, Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-
1310); Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Counties, Council of State Governments, U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, National League of Cities, Nat'l
Governors' Ass'n, and Int'l City Management Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent, Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-1310).
75. The brief of the International Association of Assessing Officers notes that the
"welcome stranger" assessment is also referred to as "sales chasing" and "shotgunning."
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Int'l Ass'n of Assessing Officers in Support of Petitioners at
6-7, Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-1310).
76. See id. at 8-9. The IAAO also supplied data on the inequities arising in Cali-
fornia under the article XIII A property taxation system. Specifically, the IAAO re-
ported the findings of an unpublished paper that "the estimated 1988 effective tax rate
for residential properties in California that have not been sold since Proposition 13 was
enacted in 1978 is less than 0.3 percent, whereas the effective tax rate for recently sold
properties is 1.0 percent." Id. at 9 (citing Break, Proposition 13's Tenth Birthday: Occa-
sion for Celebration or Lament? 14-21 (unpublished paper presented at Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy's Tax Policy Roundtable, Apr. 28-30, 1988, Coronado, Cal.)).
77. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Taxpayers Union in Support of Petition-
ers at 13, Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-1310).
78. The National Taxpayers Union raised the question of whether provisions of
section 2 of article XIII A of the California Constitution can be severed from the rest of
the provisions enacted by Proposition 13 (such as the one percent limitation on tax rates
and the two percent inflation cap). See id. This issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
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The California court's analysis . . . rests on vague expectations about pre-
dictable rates of taxation. While sudden increases in tax bills are a concern
shared by the National Taxpayers Union, they are not a justification for
forcing some people to bear a disproportionately large shdre of the costs of
government. The concern is more appropriately addressed by limiting taxes
for all citizens.7 9
The NTU noted the major impact of the decision in Allegheny Pitts-
burgh "[might] not be felt in West Virginia, where the legislature
has already mandated that new assessments bring all property valua-
tions up to date."80 Therefore, the NTU believed it was justified in
extrapolating beyond the issues of the case at hand. It concluded
that "holding the 'welcome stranger' assessment method unconstitu-
tional would further the goals of reasonable and equitable taxation.
The problem of excessive increases in property taxation can be con-
trolled without resorting to discriminatory taxation."'"
Two amici curiae briefs arguing in support of Proposition 13's as-
sessment method were submitted in support of the respondents in
Allegheny Pittsburgh. One of these was sponsored, in part, by Paul
Gann, co-author of California's Proposition 13.11 It is clear the brief
was submitted to defend California's system of property taxation.
The introductory statement of "Interest of Amici" concludes:
"Amici's participation in this case stems from their support for Cali-
fornia's Proposition 13. Amici support the discretion of the states to
determine tax policy independently. This discretion must include the
ability to adopt a property tax assessment system such as that con-
tained in Proposition 13. " 83 This brief described California's policy
basis for the difference in assessments.
California has adopted a system that limits the year by year tax increases
on property. This state policy prevents a property owner from being con-
fronted with rapidly increasing property taxes as a result of an increase in
market value that is of no benefit to the property owner until time of sale.
California declines to tax the potential gain that might result if property
were sold.8'
Unfortunately, the brief does not cite any references that might ar-
ticulate this refusal to tax "the potential gain" as the official or unof-
ficial state policy. Other descriptions of this policy in the brief pro-
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id.
82. Brief of Amici Curiae, Pacific Legal Foundation, Paul Gann, and California
Tax Reduction Movement in Support of Respondent, Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct.
633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-1310).
83. See id. at 3.
84. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
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vide citations to the majority opinion in Amador Valley; these
citations lead only to the unsupported statements of the California
Supreme Court regarding the presumed state policy.8 5
The other amicus curiae brief submitted in support of the respon-
dents was sponsored by a coalition of associations of municipal and
state government officials. It described the California system of prop-
erty taxation as "another good example of the constitutional flexibil-
ity that state and local governments have exercised in the area of
valuation of property for tax purposes."86
B. Proposition 13 after Allegheny Pittsburgh
In Allegheny Pittsburgh, the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized the comparative nature of an equal protection violation. In
that case, the petitioners paid taxes based upon fifty percent of the
current market value of their land, as determined by the recent
purchase price, while owners of similarly situated property paid
taxes on only a fraction of the current market value. Similarly,
under article XIII A of the California Constitution, one person may
be assessed at one percent of current market value and another at a
fraction of the current market value.
Based on the arguments made in the amici curiae briefs submitted
in Allegheny Pittsburgh v. Webster County, it is clear the Supreme
Court did not initiate a new dispute over the constitutionality of Cal-
ifornia's system of property taxation-that dispute has been brewing
since Proposition 13 was introduced. There are three closely interre-
lated reasons why section 2 of article XIII A of the California Con-
stitution, containing the assessment provisions, might be subject to
future attack in the courts.
1. State Policy
Only if California has officially or unofficially adopted a reasona-
ble policy which would justify the property tax disparities caused by
Proposition 13 can the assessment provisions of section 2, article
XIII A of the California Constitution survive an attack on equal pro-
85. For example, the authors of the brief argued that the California "system re-
sults from a decision that property taxes should be firmly grounded in the original cost of
the property, and should not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of the property." Id.
at 9. To support this statement, the brief cites Amador Valley v. Board of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 235, 583 P.2d 1281, 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 251 (1978). For a
description of the Court's discussion of policy that can be found on this page of the
majority opinion, see supra notes 35-36, 39 and accompanying text.
86. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Counties, Council of State Governments, U.S.
Conference of Mayors, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Nat'l League of Cities,
Nat'l Governors' Ass'n, and Int'l City Management Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 10, Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-
1310).
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tection grounds. Thus, the pivotal issue is: Is there such a policy?
The honest answer may be that there is no answer. Proposition 13
was approved by a large margin of the voters of California, 7 but
there may have been as many rationales behind the affirmative votes
as there were voters. A review of reports of some of the legislative
hearings after the passage of Proposition 13 indicated that the legis-
lature was not absolutely sure of the policy behind the initiative.
The underlying concerns have been identified in a number of ways.
Certainly, it was clear "the voters were concerned about the high
level of taxes."88 The legislature seemed to operate under the pre-
sumption that the policy underlying Proposition 13 had more to do
with the tax revolt against big government than preventing taxation
of unrealized gains in property value. In 1978, the Senate Commit-
tee on Revenue and Taxation stated an intent to act to "implement
the people's wishes for responsible but prudent levels of government
as indicated by the passage [of Proposition 13]. '"89 That concern was
echoed in later legislative hearings. In 1987, the Joint Legislative
Budget Committee hearing found "the public perception of govern-
ment size and trustworthiness [had] improved dramatically since
1978."9o
Stability in property tax burdens was another rationale articulated
in support of Proposition 13.
The effect of the Section 2 assessment restrictions is to stabilize taxes for
persons who remain in their homes, and allow increases to market value
only for those acquiring or improving real property.
Howard Jarvis himself has consistently maintained that such a result was
intentional, not accidental. Earlier . . . he was quoted to the effect that he
put that provision in so people buying new homes would know exactly what
tax burdens they faced, as the tax would stay the same (except for the 2
percent increases) as long as they didn't move. An existing owner would
have the stability of the 1975 level value. 91
In Allegheny Pittsburgh, the United States Supreme Court attrib-
uted an economic rationale to Proposition 13: preventing the taxation
87. "Proposition 13 was approved by an overwhelming 65% of the voters .. "
JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMM., PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER, A REPORT ON
THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE'S HEARING OF
SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 pt. 1, at 3 (Nov. 11, 1987).
88. Id.
89. Joint Interim Hearings, Proposition 13 State and Local Fiscal Outlook, Sen-
ate Comm. on Revenue and Tax'n, Sess. 1 (1978) (remarks of Sen. John W. Holmdahl).
90. JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMM., supra note 87, at pt. 1, at 3.
91. ASSEMBLY REVENUE AND TAX'N COMM., supra note 21, at A-7. Howard
Jarvis was co-author of Proposition 13 (with Paul Gann).
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of unrealized gains. 2 The exact origins of this economic rationale
are unclear. In 1980, however, the Assembly Revenue and Taxation
Committee was told:
Another rationale in defense of the "acquisition value" approach was sup-
plied by economist Neil H. Jacoby, who as a member of the Commission on
Government Reform (Post Commission) appointed by Governor Brown in
the wake of Prop. 13, stated in the "Supplementary Views" section of the
Commission's final report: "[T]his feature of Proposition 13 ("unequal
treatment") is no different in principle from the situation where one tax-
payer has a realized capital gain on which he is taxed, while another tax-
payer owning identical property has an unrealized capital gain on which he
is not taxed. . . . [D]ifferences in the assessed values of identical properties
arising from transfers of ownership at different dates will disappear as in-
flation is slowed and ultimately stopped-which is U.S. national policy
today." 93
The amicus curiae brief sponsored in part by Paul Gann and submit-
ted in support of the respondents in Allegheny Pittsburgh reiterated
this economic rationale.94
The fact that article XIII A was created by the initiative process,
thus making the process of determining the state policy behind its
provisions something of a guessing game, may explain the California
Supreme Court's treatment of the equal protection challenge in
Amador Valley. In particular, it might explain the Court's accept-
ance of the assessment of property owners on the "acquisition value
basis predicated on the owner's free and voluntary acts of purchase"
as "an arguably reasonable basis for assessment." 95
2. Constitutionality of Tax Classification
Second, Proposition 13 might be ripe for attack in the courts is
that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Allegheny Pitts-
burgh throws doubt on the types of classification used in California.
It has already been established in a long line of cases that certain
kinds of classification made by states for taxation purposes are pre-
sumptively valid. An example of an acceptable classification is the
"class" of commercial real property as distinguished from the
"class" of residential real property.96 Nevertheless, these cases do
not necessarily support distinctions between similarly situated prop-
erty within those classes. In California, under article XIII A, accept-
able classes of real property (e.g., commercial versus residential) are
subdivided by date of purchase (or by dates of later major improve-
92. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 633, 638 n.4
(1989).
93. ASSEMBLY REVENUE AND TAX'N COMM., supra note 21, at A-14.
94. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
95. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 235, 583 P.2d 1281, 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 251 (1978).
96. See supra notes 10-14, 60-63 and accompanying text.
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ments). There are no Supreme Court cases upholding these kinds of
subclassifications.
In Allegheny Pittsburgh, the "class" of property owned by coal
mining corporations was subdivided and discriminations were made
between corporations owning similar property; the discrimination
was based upon the date of purchase of the property. In California,
the "class" of mining land owned by corporations is similarly subdi-
vided for purposes of allocating the tax burden by length of owner-
ship. Likewise, in California, the "class" of residential real property
is subdivided between homeowners who recently purchased and those
who reap the comparative benefits of a lower tax burden because of
a longer period of ownership.
In Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Supreme Court reiterated that the
States have power to distinguish between different classes of taxpay-
ers. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the State's policy must
be "applied evenhandedly to all similarly situated property within
the state."97 The "fairness of one's allocable share of the total prop-
erty tax burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by comparison
with the share of others similarly situated relative to their property
holdings."98
In Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court decided that distinctions made
between similarly situated property on the basis of length of owner-
ship did not fairly or evenhandedly apply the state's tax policy. Thus,
the analysis returns to the pivotal issue of the existence and defini-
tion of the state's tax policy and whether it justifies disparate tax
treatment within otherwise acceptable "classes" of real property.
3. Actual Disparate Treatment
Third, as Chief Justice Bird predicted in Amador Valley v. Board
of Equalization, the passage of time may have made the "skewed
nature of the tax world created by Article XIIIA" more pro-
nounced. 99 Because of the exaggerated disparities, a sympathetic Su-
preme Court might be compelled to consider whether article XIII A
denies equal protection to similarly situated property owners.
The California Supreme Court decided Amador Valley in a vac-
uum. The petitioners were "various governmental agencies and con-
cerned citizens" who challenged the constitutional validity of Pro-
97. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 639.
98. Id.
99. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 252, 583 P.2d at 1305, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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position 13 immediately upon its adoption by the initiative
process.100 The court noted there were inherent dangers in the argua-
bly premature equal protection challenge, and that the court "could
decline to consider the issue in the abstract and instead await its
resolution within the framework of an actual controversy wherein the
disparity is pivotal."'' But, because it decided that leaving the equal
protection question unresolved would create too much uncertainty
and confusion throughout the state, the court opted to "treat the
equal protection issue as constituting an attack upon the face of the
article itself."'102
The problems of deciding the issue of equal protection in the ab-
stract are apparent even within Amador Valley: the majority opinion
and the dissenting opinion focused on two different hypotheticals.10 3
Only Chief Justice Bird, in her dissent, noted that as time passes, the
disparity in tax treatment of similarly situated owners would become
more and more pronounced.10 4 And neither the majority nor the dis-
senting opinion hints at the possible ultimate range of disparity. The
potential for exaggerated disparities is perhaps best reflected by the
facts in the Allegheny Pittsburgh case.
Eleven years after the passage of Proposition 13, the contours of
the abstract concerns of the petitioners in Amador Valley have been
filled in with facts which reflect significant disparities between the
property tax burdens placed on owners of otherwise similar proper-
ties-disparities which are tied to the date of purchase of the prop-
erty, not to differences in the actual value of the property.0 5
100. Id. at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
101. Id. at 233, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
102. Id.
103. The majority opinion considered two independent pieces of property, one pur-
chased in 1975 for $40,000 and the other purchased in 1977 for $80,000; the court found
the resulting difference in taxes was fair because each owner was assessed and taxed at
"the price he was willing and able to pay for that property." Id. at 235, 583 P.2d at
1293, 149 Cal Rptr. at 251. In the dissent, Judge Bird considered a different hypotheti-
cal highlighting the disparity between two identical pieces of property:
Consider these facts. John and Mary Smith live next door to Tom and Sue
Jones. Their houses and lots are identical with current market values of
$80,000. The Smiths bought their home in January of 1975 when the market
value was $40,000. The Joneses bought their home in 1977 when the market
value was $60,000. In 1977, both homes were assessed at $60,000, and both
couples paid the same amount of property tax. However, under article XIIIA
in 1978, the Joneses will pay 150 percent of the taxes that the Smiths will pay.
Should a third couple buy the Smiths' home in 1978, that couple would pay
twice the taxes that the Smiths would have paid for the same home had they
not sold it.
Id. at 249, 583 P.2d at 1303, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61.
104. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
105. Actually, two kinds of disparities have been identified.
There are two fundamental inequities frequently attributed to the acquisition
value approach. The first is the system unavoidably results in differing values
for otherwise similar properties. . . . The second inequity cited is that the ac-
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Whether or not the cold, hard facts of the disparate property tax
burdens placed upon actual owners would convince the California
Supreme Court to reconsider its "abstract" equal protection analysis
cannot be answered here.
C. Equal Protection Remedies
An additional facet of Proposition 13 that may have been inade-
quately addressed in Amador Valley because of the abstract nature
of the equal protection issue is that the California Supreme Court
looked at only one side of the issue: the comparative benefits given to
long-term property owners. 10 The court ignored the responsibility of
the state to remedy the higher taxes paid by the more recent
purchaser.
In Allegheny Pittsburgh v. Webster County, the United States Su-
preme Court held the equal protection remedy can and must work
either way. The state may not impose the burden of equalization of
tax treatment on the disadvantaged taxpayer. A property owner who
has been denied equal protection "may not be remitted by the State
to the remedy of seeking to have the assessments of the undervalued
property raised."'0 7 In other words, the state may be required to re-
duce the assessed value of newly purchased property and taxes of the
newer owners to make the tax burdens comparable with the lower
valued property of long-term owners, if it cannot increase the assess-
ment value of the undervalued properties.
quisition value approach results in a greater shift in tax burden from commer-
cial properties to residential properties than did the prior fair market value
system.
ASSEMBLY REVENUE AND TAX'N COMM., supra note 21, at A-7. Discussion of the latter
inequity is beyond the scope of this Note.
The National Taxpayers Union (NTU) analyzed the disparity in tax burdens by re-
viewing the data on the "coefficient of dispersion," which is a "generally accepted stan-
dard of assessment uniformity." It is "average absolute deviation of a group of assess-
ment ratios, taken around the median ratio and expressed as a percentage of that
measure." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Int'l Ass'n of Assessing Officers in Support of
Petitioners at 10, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 109 S. Ct. 633(1989) (Nos. 87-1303, 87-1310). The NTU found that "[i]n 1976, California ranked
sixth among states nationwide in terms of this measure of assessment uniformity, but in
1981, California ranked thirty-third." Id. at 11.
106. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 234, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
107. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 639. The Court also cited Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1945); Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S.
441, 445-47 (1923); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931);
and Cumberland Coal Co. v. Greene County, 284 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1931).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of Proposition 13 seemed conclusively settled
by the California Supreme Court in Amador Valley v. Board of
Equalization until the United States Supreme Court decided Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster
County. Despite the existence of unanswered questions which the
Supreme Court has apparently revived in Allegheny Pittsburgh, the
principles laid down in the line of cases cited by the California Su-
preme Court in Amador Valley in support of article XIII A remain
intact after Allegheny Pittsburgh."0 8 Additionally, as Justice Bird
pointed out, short of reviving the Lochner era, the courts will be re-
luctant to overturn state laws even though they appear to be "un-
wise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought" on the sole basis of denial of equal protection if the state
has based the challenged law on a reasonable state policy. 10 9
The difficulty here is in defining the policy behind a popularly ap-
proved initiative. Both the California Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court have accepted the existence of such a policy,
although neither has provided any support for the assumption. The
difficulty of proving the rationale in favor of Proposition 13 could be
seen as an invitation to challenge its validity.
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108. See supra notes 8-15, 60-63 and accompanying text.
109. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 255-56, 583 P.2d 1281, 1307, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 264-65 (1978).
